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I. Introduction 
During the last two decades considerable pressure has been placed on 
connnunities and cities for the delivery of a variety of services to 
citizens. The expenditures of state and local governments expanded over 
six-fold from 6.8 percent of GNP in 1948 to approximately 12.5 percent in 
1970. During the same period both the GNP and Federal non-defense expen-
ditures tripled. The increased pressures upon local governments seem to 
indicate no change in this trend is in sight. 
This growth of the local public sector in the U. s. can, in large 
part, be attributed to population and income growth, technological pro-
gress in the private sector, and structural rigidity in the local govern-
ment system. Increases in population generally require a greater supply 
of community services to enable consumers to remain at the same level of 
consumption as before the increase. A more affluent citizenry wi11 tend 
to increase its demand for both public and private goods under the assump-
tion that all goods are "normal." 
Technological progress in the private sector exerts an tnf luence on 
expenditures through the janitorial activities of local government. The 
technological revolution in food and beverage packaging is a case in 
point. 
It has been argued that structural rigidity has played a major role 
in the expansion of the local public sector. The main economic crit1-
cism of local goverument structure stems from the alleged inability of 
local governments to either deal with externalities or take advantage of 
economies of scale in community service supply.l/ The problem of 
*Valuable conments received from D. W Adams, F. J. Hitzhusen, and L. J. 
Hushak on an earlier draft. 
]J cf. 
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externalities is generally one of the inability of one community to 
exclude benefits or damages from its production of public services from 
flowing externally to other communities. Public health and crime pro-
tection are two examples of services from which benefits may flow external 
to the community. 
Benefit spillovers are not particularly linked to community size. 
However, because of the size, closer juxtaposition, and greater inter-
dependence of economic activity in the urban community, inefficiencies 
due to such externalities mainly occur in urban govern~ent. Governments 
in large urban centers should also be able to internalize these exter-
nalities more easily because of the closer juxtaposition. 
The existence of economies of scale in local government service 
delivery is by no means settled and remains an empirical question from 
the standpoint of size. For example, in cost studies of primary and 
secondary schools, Riew L-11_7 analyzed senior high schools in Wisconsin 
and found that economies of scale existed up to an enrollment level of 
1,675 students. Burkhead L-2_7 studied high schools in Chicago and found 
no significant economies of scale but was analyzing high schools with 
an average enrollment of 2,200. In the area of hospital services Ro L 12_/ 
found a negative relationship between in-patient expenditures per admis-
sion over a hospital size range of 36 to 794 beds. Cohen L 3_/ found 
that over a range of hospital size from 150 to 350 beds the average unit 
cost function was approximately horizontal. Will L 15_/ found in his 
study of fire protection in cities ranging in size from 50,000 to one 
million population that economies of scale were exhausted at a city size 
of approximately 300,000. Some weaknesses in his study included a lack 
of fixed management measure and the use of service level standards having 
scale economies already built into them. Hirsch's L 5_/ study of fire protect 
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indicates the economies of scale are exhausted at a population of approxi-
mately 110,000. 
It appears that benefits from economies of scale are mainly concen-
trated in services such as power, public health services, sewage disposal, 
water treatment, and delivery, and in the regulatory services such as air 
pollution control. Johnston l-8_7 found economies of scale in electric 
power supply. Isard and Coughlin L 7_/ studied secondary sewage treat-
ment in Massachusetts and found benefits from economies of scale could 
be gained. 
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations L l_I 
reported that it costs $58 per million gallons to provide primary sewage 
treatment in a million gallon facility, but less than half this amount 
for a ten million gallon facility. Cosgrove and Hushak L 4_/ found bene-
fits from unit cost reductions could be obtained by expansion of water 
treatment facilities in cities in Ohio. The decline in the unit cost 
functions of their study indicate that expanded systems should be several 
times larger than decentralized systems in order to realize great bene-
fits fro~ cost reduction. In this sense, water treatment capacity would 
go from a small facility of approximately 370 million gallons per year in 
mean flow to over 21,000 million gallons per year representing a city 
size difference of from 5,000-10,000 to over 50,000. 
For most of the~e latter-mentioned services economies of scale are 
likely to be exhaust~d at populations which represent fairly large commu-
nities or cities; i.e., in the wide range of 50,000 to 300,000 population.£/ 
Certain specialized services can also gain by cost reductions in expan-
sion. Again, the populations involved are large. For example, such special 
~/ cf. Hirsch L 6_/. 
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crime protection services as communications and crime laboratories can 
be most efficiently operated by larger government units and service 
several smaller communities such as exist in large urban centers. 
A service such as water supply is likely to gain more from realizing 
scale economies in consolidation or expansion than from internalization 
of benefit spillovers since the service is more like a private good as 
viewed in the mixed public-private good spectrum. Spillovers from this 
service can be more easily adjusted by intergovernmental fiscal arrange-
ments. 
Given that gains from scale economies can be realized and that exter-
nalities can be internalized, major local community government reorgani-
zation is implied as the solution to the inefficiencies and increased 
supply of services. In fact, the reorganization should tend toward 
consolidation or some kind of expansion arrangement. Many inter-local 
and contractual agreements on financing and purchase have been made and 
some communities have merged. Some specialized services have been assigned 
to larger city or county governments to service several smaller communi-
ties within close proximity of the larger government. However, extensive 
consolidation in the U. S. has not taken place.l/ Tiebout L 13_/ has 
suggested the lack of consolidation may be due to the fact that the cri-
terion of good government goes beyond the criterion of least cost supply 
of services. The existence of many local government units offers a 
variety of fiscal chcices and flexibility in citizen control. If mobility 
is most dependent upon community service delivery this may be true; however 
there may be some implications of consolidation itself that combined with 
service production and preferences retard the rate of community consolidation. 
11 Netzer L-10_7 points this out with respect to the formation of special 
metropolitan districts. 
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This paper, using a simple model, graphical analysis, and simplifying 
assumptions attempts to analyze some implications of consolidation to gain 
from the benefits of cost reductions due to scale economies and draw some 
conclusions about the supply of community services. The sections that 
follow develop the simple model and make use of it in analyzing community 
consolidation and alternatives to consolidation and their implications for 
service supply. 
II. The Mode 1 
At the outset assume a local government system in which all citizens 
having the same tastes and income level are divided into two conununities, 
A and B, each having population N. Assume also that only two goods are 
available, a private good, x, and a good, y, which is a public type ser-
vice such as sewage disposal or water service. We will assume that no 
external benefits or damages spillover into the other cormnunity from the 
supply of yin any one of the communities. This assumption means we are 
specifying a particular impure public good which is very much similar in 
properties as the private good x. 
j7cJ,PU-/a.,li()f'1. 
The gooc, y, is assumed to be produced proportional to Q kp t and 
at decreasing unit cost up to a certain point, Ye• where economies of 
scale are exhausted, while the private good is produced at constant 
unit cost in the relevant range. Therefore, the production possibilities 
set faced by each citizen can be specified for each connnunity as: 
(1) 
2 2 dx/dy< o, d x/dy ~o. 
Under the above assumptions the production possibilities set for each citi-
zen of each of the two communities is then defined on a per capita basis. 
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Likewise, the consumption set is a representative citizen consumption 
set. 
Given these assumptions about the production possibilities and con-
sumption possibilities sets for a representative citizen in any one of the 
two communities, each citizen maximizes the utility function, 
(2) U = U(y, x), ci U/ d x > o, a 2u/ 6 x 2 < o 
2J u/ o y > o, a 2u; a y2 < o 
subject to the production possibilities constraint. This maximization 
yields the optimum consumption bundle (Y*, x*) achieving utility level 
U* = U(y*, x*) depending on the tastes of each citizen (each citizen is 
assumed at the outset to have equal tastes). Two polar (corner solutions) 
optimum consumption bundles (y*, x*) may exist depending on the preferences 
of each citizen. One such optimum bundle is (y* = o, x* = x 0 ), is 
(y* = y0 , x* = o). These two cases are shown along with the case for 
which local conditions are such that the slope of the indifference curve 
and production possibilities frontier are equal (point 1) in Figure 1. 
The production frontier is illustrated by the curve x0 y0 , assuming y is 
produced at declining unit cost. The bundle (Y* = y 0 , x = o) is the case 
such that the indifference curve is everywhere less steep relative to the 
production possibilities frontier. The more realistic polar optimum 
(corner solution) is such that none of the goody is consumed; i.e., 
(Y* = o, x = x 0 ). This is representative of the small conununity where no 
public-type services are produced within the corrnnunity. 
The production possibilities frontier, x 0 y 0 , is such that as more y 
is produced, less and less x is given up. The curve becomes more convex 
as it approaches the private good axis and flatter as the community ser-
vice good axis is approached. As more y is produced scale economies are 
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FIGURE l 
realized but at a decreasing rate. The consumption of the community 
service can increase either by an increase in population or by taking 
advantage of the economies of scale. Private good consumption can 
increase only by an increase in income. 
Now let us analyze the gains from consolidation, if any, and attempt 
to outline some alternative institutional or fiscal arrangements to con-
solidation. The next section will deal with consolidation and analyze 
the implications for community service supply. The fourth section will 
analyze what we shall call a semi-autonomous firm arrangement and its supply 
implications. The fifth section will briefly outline conmunity coopera-
tion under our assumptions about scale economies and its relation to con-
solidation. 
III. Consolidation 
By consolidation we mean the process of cormnunity consolidation to 
produce the good, y. We attempt to analyze the benefits of consolidation 
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and cases in which it is feasible. We assume that after consolidation of 
communities, the new community is closed and that no spillovers occur 
either within the community or external to the consolidated community. 
Consolidation allows cost reductions to be realized as more y is pro-
duced. The production possibilities frontier under consolidation becomes 
flatter and approaches linearity as more units of the service are produced. 
This is illustrated by the curve x0 y1 in Figure 1. 
Consolidation increases the possibility that some community service 
will be produced along with the private good, if the preferences are 
represented by Ux (increased level to U~) as shown in Figure 1. Of course, 
the move to a higher indifference curve depends on preferences and the 
degree of exhaustion of economies of scale; i.e., the shape of the produc-
tion possibilities frontier under consolidation. If preferences are 
represented by either U or Ux in our case, then consolidation is Pareto 
preferable to separate supply by any one community. 
If consolidation brings about a full exhaustion of scale economies 
and y can be produced at constant unit cost over the relevant range of 
production, the production possibilities frontier will be represented by 
the line x~ Ye shown in Figure 1. Again, consolidation is Pareto-preferable 
to decentralized supply. For the set of preferences represented by Uy, 
consolidation also results in a Pareto-preferred bundle as now some of the 
private good is added to the consumption set. 
Difference in lcste. Now let us relax the assumption in the simple 
model that tastes are equal. The citizens of the two communities, A and B, 
are now at different points on their production possibilities frontier. 
Let us refer now to Figure 2. 
Consolidation will, if undertaken, result in only one level of the 
community service being supplied in the new community. Not all consumption 
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FIGURE 2 
bundles in the consolidated consumption possibilities set are preferred 
by the citizens of A and B to the bundles consumed under separate community 
service supply. The level of service supply will be arrived at by the 
relative bargaining power of citizens of each community. 
In order for consolidation to be feasible at all, the production pos-
sibilities frontier has to rotate such that the consolidated frontier x0 y 1 
at least intersects with the intersection of the original indifference 
curves (UA and u8) of the two communities; i.e., sufficient cost reductions 
5J,. ,_d-e.J 
in the increased proJ,.ction of y have to be gained. The crus he:41:clre.d-
area, V, in Figure 2, ls a non-empty set such that V = wnz, where Wand z 
are subsets of the consolidated production possibilities set which are 
preferable to the separate production possibilities sets for corranunities 
A and B respectively. Within the set, V, their will exist a consumption 
bundle which is preferred by all but which none lose. By relaxing the 
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assumption of identical tastes between cormnunities, we conclude that taste 
differences imply that consolidation no longer is generally preferable to 
separate supply of the community service. The preferability depends on 
the extent of the taste differences and the degree of gain in taking advan-
tage of economies of scale in the production of the community service. 
Unequal Incomes. Next we allow income levels to differ between the 
two communities. Let us assume that community A is the wealthier connnunity. 
Under this assumption, and as illustrated in Figure 3, the production pos-
sibilities set faced by citizens of community A (OEF) dominates the corres-
ponding set faced by citizens of B (OCD). Under consolidation each 
community's production possibilities frontier expands but each in rela-
tion to the expansion path, the income difference, and the degree of cost 
reduction of the other community as movement down the declining unit cost 
function occurs as the production of y increases. The new production 
possibilities frontiers under consolidation are DH and FI for communities 
B and A respectively. 
y 
0 
I U' 
/-A 
FIGURE 3 
x 
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The per capita cost of y supplied above H exceeds the income level 
of citizens in B thus making these levels of supply infeasible under con-
solidation. As was the case with taste differences, the feasible set is 
confined to the area V. Again, if sufficient expansion of the production 
possibilities set is not accomplished there will be no incentive for con-
solidation. Likewise, if the income differences between the communities 
is sufficiently great, the set V will be empty and consolidation will be 
infeasible. It is realistic to conjecture but still depending on the 
relative convexity of preferences, that the set, V, is empty for two com-
munities unequal in income and the poorer cormnunity initially producing 
none of the community service. However, the less wealthy community 
stands to gain more from consolidation both in the increase in the consump-
tion bundle (more y) and from the gains of economies of scale realized 
under consolidation. No general conclusion can be made, however, about the 
Pareto-preferability of community consolidation to that of separate com-
munity supply of the service, y. 
IV. The Semi-Autonomous Firm and Community Service Supply 
Community consolidation in the supply of community services was shown 
to be a feasille community arrangement only if the preferences and incomes 
of the citizens of the communities involved were similar relative to each 
other. If preference and income differences are wide then substantial 
gains in cost reduct;ons in the increased production of community services 
would have to be realized by the communities involved in order to make 
consolidation feasible. It is unlikely that such substantial gains are 
enjoyed by large communities; i.e., cities having a population over 100,000. 
Communities may stand to gain from expansion in some services such as 
water supply and sewage disposal. However, under consolidation community 
autonomy has to be sacrificed and agreement reached on the supply of 
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services made available under such an arrangement. Again, this implies 
similar preference and income positions of the corrnnunities involved. 
An institutional arrangement that has mainly been centered around 
the supply of water to communities, and to some degree, the regionaliza-
tion of sewage disposal, is that of a semi-autonomous firm from which the 
communities can purchase the desired amount of service according to taste 
and income position.~/ This type of arrangement ranges from complete 
control by one community to joint control by several communities in which 
production decisions are left to the management of the semi-autonomous 
firm. 
Cost reductions can be realized by each community involved by setting 
up the semi-autonomous firm for the purpose of producing the community 
service most efficiently; i.e., to approach least cost production of the 
service. Each community can purchase the desired quantity of the service 
which is dictated by the preferences, income level and population of the 
community, but in relation to the production possibilities set of the 
other communities involved. For the two community model developed, the 
amount rf y purchased by anyone of the two communities from the semi-
autonomous firm is such that the equality (dx/dy)A = (dx/dy)B holds since 
the price of y has to be th~ same to each community under the assumption 
that the production possibilities sets are defined on a per capita basis. 
The expansion path of any one community can only be defined given the 
expansion path of th~ other community. Without the assumption that out-
put is proportional to population, then the tangency points of indifference 
curves with production possibilities frontiers of the two communities would 
'±I We do not attempt to cover the argument for a river basin wide firm in the case of sewage disposal in relation to water quality. That 
argument involves the internaliz.!_ti~n of externalities with which we 
do not deal. Kneese and Bower L 9_/ analyze this type of firm. 
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not necessarily have to be at equal slopes. 
Figure 4 illustrates the use for the semi-autonomous firm arrangement. 
Unequal preferences and income levels are assumed where community A 
initially is represented by the production possibilities frontier FE and 
indifference curve UA, and community B is represented by corresponding 
curves DC and UB. Under the semi-autonomous firm arrangement cost 
reductions are obtained by the additional production of y and the produc-
tion frontiers of A and B rotate in relation to each other to the new 
frontiers FI and DH respectively. The new utility levels UA and Us show 
the expanded optimum consumption bundles of both communities. The 
tangency point of UA to the production possibilities frontier, Fl, for 
community A must be equal to the tangency of U~ with DH for community B. 
I D' 
y 
x 
FIGURE 4 
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If full exhaustion of the economies of scale in the supply of y is 
realized by the semi-autonomous firm, then the production possibilities 
frontiers become linear as depicted by FF' and DD' for communities A and 
B respectively. The new utility levels then become UA and UB. The 
relative gains made by the communities in relation to each other is 
dependent on the differences of the communities with respect to preferences 
and income and the amount of y each may be supplying under complete decent-
ralization. 
Where feasible, the supply of the community service by a semi-
autonomous firm will be Pareto-preferable to separate supply irrespective 
of community income level and preferences. Each connnunity can purchase 
the desired quantity of y at the price determined by the scale of the 
production of y by the semi-autonomous firm. In situations where consoli-
dation is unattractive due to wide income and preference differences, 
supply of community services by a semi-autonomous firm may be feasible 
in increasing the consumption bundles of citizens at the same time 
community autonomy may be maintained. Only mutual agreement on the type 
of firm and agreement to an outside supply source is required of any 
community. Obviously, factors such as conveyance costs, locational 
agreements and position, and the degree of close proximity of communities 
involved are determinants of the type of agreement communities will make 
in setting up such a firm for the supply of community services. 
V. Community Cooperation in the Supply of Services 
There is anothet alternative to consolidation of community service 
supply. This is an arrangement whereby communities cooperate in the pro-
duction of services. What is understood by cooperation in public finance 
is that community service supply is undertaken cooperatively by communities 
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and,at the same time,the supply of the service can be undertaken separately 
by each community if desired in order to augment the supply of the service 
to its citizens. Let us analyze what implications our simple model has 
for cooperation. 
Let us make the same assumptions as were imposed in the development 
of the original model. The communities A and B may be at different 
levels in the consumption of y and x as illustrated in Figure 5 by UA and 
UB. Cooperation is feasible whenever consolidation is feasible; i.e., 
when preferences and income levels of the communities are similar. Within 
the set, V, of feasible consumption bundles, each community will move to 
its highest indifference curve obtainable under cooperation (UA, Us). 
The cooperative production possibilities frontier becomes the segmented 
curve, x0 ycy1 , an expansion of the separate supply frontier, x0 y 0 • How-
ever, if one of the communities desires to augment its supply of y to its 
y 
x 
FIGURE 5 
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citizens beyond the level of supply under cooperation the relevant 
segment of the new production possibilities frontier is y y since 
c 1 
separate supply of y now has to be undertaken at a higher cost than under 
cooperation. A corner solution is derived and it is not likely that 
separate supply will be undertaken. The solution of cooperation is the 
solution of consolidation developed above. If income differences are 
allowed, the same conclusions that were arrived at under consolidation 
apply for the use of cooperation. 
VI. Conclusions 
The simple model developed is by no means a generalized model of 
consolidation and the supply of comm.unity services. It does, however, 
develop a framework for viewing alternative connnunity service supply 
arrangements and their implications for expanding the consumption bundles 
of citizens which may include community services. Some of the reasons, 
in a welfare context, for the lack of mass consolidation in the U. S. 
have been pointed out by the operation of the model. The public good case; 
i.e., externalities and the gains from internalization, has not been 
incorporated into the model but the case of declining cost production of 
community ser1ices and gains from cost reductions has been included. 
In particular, the analysis leads to the conclusion that, first, 
consolidation in order to take advantage of cost reductions may not result 
in gains to all, and further, depends on the income and taste differences 
of communities and the degree of cost reduction in the consolidation. 
Second, when consolidation is not Pareto-preferred to separate community 
service supply, cost reductions can be gained by agreement by communities 
to allow a semi-autonomous firm to supply services at least cost or at 
levels approaching least cost supply. Where feasible, this form of supply 
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is Pareto-preferable to separate supply irrespective of income and 
preference differences between communities. The community still main-
tains a degree of autonomy separate of other communities. 
Community cooperation under the assumptions of the simple model 
developed becomes the same solution in terms of community service supply 
level as in the case of consolidation. Wherever consolidation is Pareto-
preferable to separate supply so also is cooperation. It is highly unlikely 
that any one community will desire to augment its supply of corrnnunity 
services beyond the level of cooperative or consolidated supply because 
of the higher cost involved and the contraction of the consumption set. 
This paper has also pointed up some areas needing further analysis. 
Further generalization of the model is needed. Investigation of supply 
implications of models for particular conununity services needs to be done. 
The case of externalities and public good supply, though covered by others, 
needs to be analyzed further. The public investment decision and public 
versus mixed public-private goods delivery needs to be related to the 
concept of economic growth and technological advance. Further analysis 
of the possibilities of developing private mechanisms for the delivery of 
public-type 'ervices and policy directed to such delivery needs also to be 
done. 
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